

# xPrivFi Technical Specification

Version 1.0 — Full Protocol Specification

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With documentation support from the XPF Assistant

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## Abstract

XPrivFi is a minimal Layer-1 blockchain paired with a structured Layer-2 mining system called **HexGrid**. The protocol introduces round-based mining with deterministic reward settlement, predictable emission, and a security model combining RandomHash proof-of-work with off-chain computation rounds. This document provides the full technical specification for developers, security researchers, and auditors.

# 1 Executive Overview

XPrivFi is built on three fundamental principles:

- **Minimal Layer-1:** A simple, predictable RandomHash blockchain.
- **Round-Based Layer-2 Mining:** HexGrid coordinates 6-minute mining rounds, selecting a single winner per cycle.
- **Deterministic Emission:** 500,000 XPF mined as 1 XPF per round over  $\sim 6.6$  years.

The goal is not to compete with large multi-team blockchain foundations, but to introduce a transparent, auditable architecture with minimal attack surface and a new model for mining participation.

The document defines:

1. Full **Layer-1** consensus, block format, networking, and difficulty.
2. Full **Layer-2** round engine specification.
3. Reward settlement and deterministic emission.
4. Threat model (Sybil, 51%, timing attacks, fairness constraints).
5. Future privacy extensions (CP-Shield).
6. Vision for optional RootBaseLayer interoperability.

## 2 Architecture Summary

XPrivFi consists of two cooperating layers:

### 2.1 Layer-1 Blockchain

- RandomHash (iPoW) consensus
- Simple UTXO/account hybrid (spec detailed in Section 3)
- 6-minute target block time
- Deterministic reward transactions from HexGrid
- Predictable emission supply

### 2.2 Layer-2 HexGrid Engine

- Off-chain computation of mining rounds
- 6-minute work cycles
- 30-second transparency phase
- 30-second lobby/commit phase
- Fairness-oriented deterministic winner selection
- Winner broadcasts a verified proof to L1

### 2.3 Data Flow Between Layers




Figure 1: L1-L2 Data Flow Overview Diagram



### 3 Glossary

**XPF** — Native currency of XPrivFi.

**HexGrid** — The Layer-2 mining framework coordinating round-based work.

**Round** — A 6-minute mining cycle consisting of:

1. Work phase
2. Transparency phase
3. Lobby phase

**Deterministic Reward** — A guaranteed output of 1 XPF per round from the mining pool.

**RandomHash (iPoW)** — A CPU-oriented proof-of-work algorithm emphasizing memory hardness and anti-GPU parallelism.

**CP-Shield** — Optional future privacy layer based on ZK commitments.

**CP-Diff** — Difficulty model used by L1 block production.

**RootBaseLayer (RBL)** — An independent experimental settlement concept that may interoperate with XPrivFi in future research.

## 4 System Goals

- Predictable monetary supply without halving schedules.
- Fairness-oriented mining for regular devices.
- Minimalistic and auditable layer separation.
- High transparency and low protocol complexity.
- Expandability through optional future modules.




Figure 2: High-Level System Architecture Diagram

## 5 Layer-1 Blockchain Specification

Layer-1 (L1) of XPrivFi is a minimal blockchain designed to provide:

- deterministic settlement of Layer-2 mining rewards,
- a predictable block structure,
- a CPU-oriented proof-of-work consensus,
- a stable, human-readable chain model.

L1 is intentionally small in scope. It does not perform smart contract execution or complex state transitions.

## 5.1 Consensus: RandomHash (iPoW)

XPrivFi uses RandomHash, a memory-hard CPU-oriented hashing algorithm. The purpose is to reduce GPU/ASIC advantages by demanding sequential, memory-bound execution.

### 5.1.1 RandomHash Properties

- High memory pressure per hash attempt.
- Unfriendly to parallel GPU execution.
- Designed to limit hardware inequality.
- Deterministic evaluation.
- Resistant to ASIC optimization due to irregular memory access patterns.

Let  $H$  denote the RandomHash function.

Given block header  $B_h$ , mining solves:

$$H(B_h) < D_t$$

where  $D_t$  is the active difficulty target.

### 5.1.2 Difficulty Target

$D_t$  is calibrated using CP-Diff v1 (Section 5.7).

## 5.2 Block Structure

Each block consists of:

$$\text{Block} = \{\text{Header}, \text{Body}\}$$

### 5.2.1 Block Header

| Field            | Description                                     |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Version          | Protocol version integer.                       |
| PreviousHash     | Hash of previous block header.                  |
| MerkleRoot       | Merkle root of body transactions.               |
| Timestamp        | Unix time (UTC).                                |
| DifficultyTarget | Current target $D_t$ .                          |
| Nonce            | Value miners vary to find valid hash.           |
| L2CommitHash     | Hash summarizing the Round Winner (if present). |

Table 1: Block Header Fields

### 5.2.2 Block Body

The body contains:

- Ordinary user transactions.
- The L2 reward settlement transaction (if produced this round).

## 5.3 Transaction Model

XPrivFi uses a hybrid model:

- accounts for balances,
- transaction-level Merkle inclusion,
- deterministic nonce ordering to prevent replay.

### 5.3.1 Transaction Format

| Field     | Description                               |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------|
| From      | Sender public key or address.             |
| To        | Recipient address.                        |
| Amount    | Amount in XPF.                            |
| Nonce     | Incrementing integer per-account.         |
| Fee       | Transaction fee (0 during initial phase). |
| Signature | Ed25519 signature.                        |

Table 2: Transaction Structure

## 5.4 Signature Scheme

XPrivFi uses Ed25519 signatures:

$$\text{sig} = \text{Ed25519}(\text{sk}, \text{txhash})$$

## 5.5 Transaction Hash

$$\text{txhash} = H(\text{serialized transaction})$$

## 5.6 Mempool Rules

A node accepts a transaction if:

- Signature is valid.
- Nonce equals account's next required nonce.
- Sender has sufficient balance.
- Transaction size is within limits.

Transactions are ordered by:

1. nonce,
2. timestamp,
3. (future) fee.

## 5.7 Block Validation

Given block  $B$ , node verifies:

### 1. Header Validation

- PreviousHash matches known chain tip.
- Timestamp is not in future.
- Hash meets difficulty target.

### 2. Body Validation

- All transactions are valid.
- No double spending.
- Nonces increase strictly.
- Reward settlement transaction matches L2 hash.

### 3. Merkle Root

- Recompute MerkleRoot from body.
- Must match header field.

## 5.8 Networking Protocol

XPrivFi uses a simple P2P gossip network.

### 5.8.1 Message Types

- NEW\_BLOCK
- TX\_BROADCAST
- REQUEST\_BLOCK
- REQUEST\_TX
- PEER\_HELLO

Nodes maintain a peer list and use epidemic broadcasting.

### 5.8.2 Block Propagation

Nodes broadcast new blocks immediately upon validation.

### 5.8.3 Transaction Propagation

Transactions are propagated with:

$$\text{Random Delay} \in [0, 120 \text{ ms}]$$

to prevent relay-pattern fingerprinting.



## 5.9 Difficulty Adjustment: CP-Diff v1

### 5.9.1 Goal

Maintain approximately:

$$T_{\text{block}} \approx 6 \text{ minutes.}$$

### 5.9.2 Formula

Let:

- $D_t$  — current difficulty target,
- $T_{\text{actual}}$  — actual block time,
- $T_{\text{target}} = 360$  seconds.

Adjustment:

$$D_{t+1} = D_t \cdot \left( 1 + \alpha \cdot \frac{T_{\text{actual}} - T_{\text{target}}}{T_{\text{target}}} \right)$$

Where:

$$\alpha = 0.12$$

Clamped between:

$$D_{t+1} \in [D_t \cdot 0.75, D_t \cdot 1.25].$$

## 5.10 Retarget Window

Difficulty is recomputed every block. This reduces temporal variance while keeping consensus stable.

## 5.11 State Machine




Figure 3: Account + Nonce State Machine Diagram

State transitions:

- **INIT** → account created
- **BALANCE\_UPDATE** → after valid transaction
- **NONCE\_INCREMENT** → after each broadcasted transaction

## 5.12 Block Reward Handling

XPrivFi does *not* mint block rewards at L1. Instead, L2 produces the reward transaction.

### 5.12.1 Reward Transaction Format

| Field   | Description                |
|---------|----------------------------|
| From    | DexPoolFund (Pool Address) |
| To      | Winning miner's address    |
| Amount  | 1 XPF                      |
| RoundID | Deterministic round index  |
| Proof   | HexGrid winner proof       |

Table 3: Reward Settlement Transaction

L1 must validate:

1. pool has remaining balance;
2. proof matches L2 commit hash in block header;
3. amount always equals 1 XPF.

## 6 Layer-2: HexGrid Mining Engine

HexGrid is the deterministic off-chain execution environment responsible for XPrivFi's round-based mining. It is not a rollup or a smart contract engine. It is a specialized computation layer with strict inputs, outputs, and timing rules.

L2 executes the computation-heavy, fairness-oriented mining cycle, while L1 validates only the final reward.

### 6.1 Core Responsibilities

HexGrid performs:

- round coordination (timing, phases, participation window),
- miner workload enforcement,
- deterministic path selection,
- randomness extraction,
- winner commitment hashing,
- reward transaction generation.

It is fully deterministic:

Identical round inputs  $\rightarrow$  Identical outputs across all honest nodes.

## 6.2 Round Structure

Each round  $R_i$  consists of three phases:

### 6.2.1 1. Work Phase (6 minutes)

Miners compute the full deterministic workload defined in Section 6.3.

All miners execute:

$$W_i = \text{ComputeRoundWork}(R_i, \text{address}, \text{seed}, \text{params})$$

This must be completed independently by every participant.

### 6.2.2 2. Transparency Phase (30 seconds)

HexGrid broadcasts:

- Loop iteration count
- Round seed
- Local winner hash candidates
- Participation count

Nodes verify consistency.

### 6.2.3 3. Lobby Phase (30 seconds)

Participants register for the next round:

$$\text{Register}(\text{address})$$

Registrations produce:

$$C_i = \text{Commitment}(\text{address}, \text{timestamp})$$

## 6.3 Round Duration

Total:

$$T_{\text{round}} = 6 \text{ minutes} + 30\text{s} + 30\text{s} \approx 7 \text{ minutes.}$$

## 6.4 Participation Rules

Each round accepts:

$$200 \leq n \leq 890$$

where  $n$  is the number of active miners.

### 6.4.1 Identity Constraint

Each identity (address) must:

- submit a valid lobby commitment,
- have a valid public key,
- perform the full workload.

### 6.4.2 Sybil Ineffectiveness

Creating  $k$  identities requires:

$$k \cdot W_i$$

work.

There is no shortcut.

## 6.5 Workload Definition

The workload is deterministic and identical for all participants.

Let:

- $R_i$  — round index,
- $A$  — miner address,
- $S_i$  — round seed,
- $M$  — workload multiplier,
- $H$  — RandomHash.

### 6.5.1 Phase 1: Initialization

$$X_0 = H(R_i \parallel A \parallel S_i)$$

### 6.5.2 Phase 2: Sequential Computation Loop

For  $j = 1 \dots M$ :

$$X_j = H(X_{j-1} \oplus j)$$

### 6.5.3 Phase 3: Final Output

$$W_i(A) = X_M$$

This output becomes the miner's *score*.

## 6.6 Winner Selection

Each miner submits:

$$\text{Score}_i(A) = W_i(A)$$

HexGrid selects:

$$A^* = \arg \min_A W_i(A)$$

Tie-breaking rule:

$$A^* = \min(\text{AddressLexicographical})$$

The selected winner is deterministic once all scores are known.

### 6.6.1 Winner Proof

The winner must submit:

$$\text{Proof} = (A^*, W_i(A^*), \text{loop outputs})$$

HexGrid commits:

$$C_i = H(\text{Proof})$$

which is embedded in the L1 block header.



## 6.7 Randomness Model

### 6.7.1 Round Seed

Seed generation:

$$S_{i+1} = H(B_i \parallel C_i)$$

where:

- $B_i$  — L1 block hash,
- $C_i$  — HexGrid commitment.

Thus, seeds are unpredictable but verifiable.

### 6.7.2 Entropy Sources

- previous block hash,
- winner proof,
- number of participants.

## 6.8 Settlement to L1

HexGrid generates the reward transaction:

$$\text{RewardTx}(A^*) = (\text{From} : \text{Pool}, \text{To} : A^*, \text{Amount} = 1 \text{ XPF})$$

Then broadcasts:

- RewardTx
- HexGrid commit hash  $C_i$
- Round index  $R_i$

L1 validates:

1. balance available in pool,
2. amount equals 1 XPF,
3. proof matches commitment.




Figure 4: L2→L1 Settlement Diagram

## 7 Fairness Constraints

### 7.1 No Shortcut Rule

Sequential computation loop prevents:

- parallel skipping,
- caching shortcuts,
- GPU-style batched vectorization.

### 7.2 Hardware Range Normalization

The workload is designed such that:

$$\frac{\text{fastest CPU}}{\text{slowest mobile device}} \approx \text{bounded factor}.$$

Phones can participate meaningfully.

### 7.3 Identity Neutrality

Number of identities does not increase chance without proportional work.

## 8 Layer-2 Threat Model

### 8.1 Sybil Attacks

Creating  $k$  identities costs  $k$  workloads. Thus, Sybil is ineffective.

### 8.2 Hardware Dominance

Adversaries with unrealistic hardware may reduce relative fairness, but do not gain infinite advantage or the ability to skip work.

### 8.3 Commitment Withholding

If a winner withholds proof:

Round is invalidated and repeated.

### 8.4 Timing Attacks

Round phases enforce fixed timings to reduce early-disclosure attacks.

### 8.5 Equivocation

All honest nodes recompute:

$$C_i = H(\text{Proof})$$

and compare.

## 9 CP-Shield (Future Privacy Layer)

CP-Shield is a research-stage privacy extension that introduces:

- ZK-protected transfers,
- note commitments,
- shielded balances,
- optional private mode.

### 9.1 Shielded Notes

$$\text{Note} = H(\text{pk}, v, r)$$

### 9.2 Nullifiers

$$\text{Nullifier} = H(\text{sk}, \text{Note})$$

### 9.3 ZK Circuit (Conceptual)

- proves note ownership,
- proves amount conservation,
- hides sender and receiver.

CP-Shield is *not* activated at mainnet launch.

## 10 RootBaseLayer Interoperability (Vision)

RootBaseLayer (RBL) is a separate experimental settlement and exchange model conceived by the creator.

### 10.1 Non-binding Outlook

XPrivFi does not depend on RBL. No integration is promised.

Possible future interoperability research includes:

- atomic swaps,
- shared entropy sources,
- L2 settlement parallels.

This remains conceptual.

## 11 Legal and Security Disclaimers

### 11.1 Informational Status

This technical specification is provided solely for:

- developers,
- researchers,
- cryptographers,
- security auditors,
- early testers.

It does *not* represent:

- financial advice,
- investment solicitation,
- securities offering,
- a guarantee of future performance,
- a promise of software behavior under all circumstances.

### 11.2 No Guarantees

XPrivFi is an experimental protocol. All specifications may evolve based on:

- security research,
- testnet feedback,
- real-world constraints,
- implementation optimizations.

### 11.3 No Liability

The creator and contributors assume no responsibility for:

- loss of funds,

- network instability,
- chain reorganizations,
- cryptographic failures,
- implementation bugs,
- third-party software defects.

## 11.4 License Boundary

This specification does not override:

- software licensing terms,
- branding restrictions,
- protocol naming rights.

Nothing in this document grants rights to:

- use the “xPrivFi” name,
- claim affiliation,
- market derivative products,
- republish portions without attribution.

## 11.5 No Trademark Claims

“XPrivFi” and associated terms are project identifiers, not registered trademarks. Nothing in this document implies trademark registration.



## 12 Security Considerations

### 12.1 L1 Considerations

The L1 blockchain inherits standard PoW security properties:

- susceptibility to 51% attacks,
- block reorganization threats,
- timestamp manipulation within bounds,
- network partitioning risks.

### 12.2 L2 Considerations

HexGrid introduces:

- deterministic fairness constraints,
- sequential workload enforcement,
- anti-shortcut computational loops.

Potential attack vectors:

1. **Workload falsification** — mitigated via deterministic recomputation.
2. **Commit withholding** — mitigated via round invalidation.
3. **High-end hardware dominance** — mitigated but not eliminated.
4. **Seed manipulation** — mitigated via L1 anchoring.

### 12.3 Sybil vs Hardware Attacks

Sybil attacks are ineffective because:

$$k \text{ identities} \Rightarrow k \text{ full workloads}$$

Hardware dominance is possible but bounded. No system can guarantee equality under extreme hardware asymmetry.

## 12.4 Privacy Risks

CP-Shield is not active. Until implementation:

- all balances are public,
- all transfers are linkable,
- miner identities are visible.

## 13 Future Work

### 13.1 Protocol Extensions

- Full CP-Shield privacy layer,
- Optimized RandomHash variants,
- Mobile-optimized verification modes,
- Adaptive round difficulty,
- Optional transaction fee markets (post-listing).

### 13.2 Developer Platform

- SDK for wallet integration,
- Reference explorer API,
- Tools for verifying HexGrid proofs,
- L1 node RPC improvements.

### 13.3 RootBaseLayer Research

While independent from XPrivFi, RootBaseLayer (RBL) offers conceptual future opportunities:

- parallel settlement bridges,
- shared randomness sources,
- experimental fee-less exchange mechanisms.

No integration is guaranteed or implied.

## 14 Extended Glossary

**Account Model** — Balance-based ledger entries with nonces.

**Block Reorganization** — A chain fork replacing recent blocks.

**Commit Hash** — The L2 hash included in L1 block headers to prove round finalization.

**Deterministic Mining** — Mining where reward outcomes are calculable from deterministic workloads.

**Lobby Phase** — A time window for miners to commit to the next round.

**Transparency Phase** — A window where round computations are revealed.

**RandomHash** — CPU-oriented proof of work used by L1.

**Mining Pool Address** — Reserved address supplying 500,000 XPF for L2 rewards.

**Seed** — Deterministic value that initializes each round.

**Winner Proof** — Verifiable proof that the selected miner completed the required work.

**ZK Proof** — A cryptographic proof allowing verification without revealing information.

## 15 Appendices

### 15.1 Appendix A: Block Diagram




Figure 5: Block Lifecycle Diagram

### 15.2 Appendix B: Round Diagram




Figure 6: HexGrid Round Structure

### 15.3 Appendix C: Proof Structure




Figure 7: Winner Proof Structure Diagram

### 15.4 Appendix D: Network Topology




Figure 8: Peer-to-Peer Topology

## 15.5 Appendix E: Possible CP-Shield Circuits




Figure 9: ZK Circuit Placeholder

## 16 References

### References

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## 17 Document Versioning

- **Version:** 1.0
- **Date:** November 2025
- **Status:** Draft (Technical Specification)
- **Scope:** L1+L2 core rules, mining model, security, future modules

### 17.1 Change Log

- v1.0 — Initial full specification suite.